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    Abstract  Recent emergence of electronic culture uplifts 
healthcare facilities to a new era with the aid of wireless sensor 
network (WSN) technology. Due to the sensitiveness of medical 
data, austere privacy and security are inevitable for all parts of 
healthcare systems. However, the constantly evolving nature and 
constrained resources of sensors in WSN inflict unavailability of 
a lucid line of defense to ensure perfect security. In order to 
provide holistic security, protections must be incorporated in 
every component of healthcare sensor networks.  This paper 
proposes an efficient security scheme for healthcare applications 
of WSN which uses the notion of public key cryptosystem. Our 
entire security scheme comprises basically of two parts; a key 
handshaking scheme based on simple linear operations and the 
derivation of decryption key by a receiver node for a particular 
sender in the network. Our architecture allows both base station 
to node or node to base station secure communications, and 
node-to-node secure communications. We consider both the 
issues of stringent security and network performance to propose 
our security scheme. 
 
    Keywords  Security, Pseudoinverse, Public Key, 
Healthcare  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Pervasive or Ubiquitous Healthcare (U-Healthcare) is viewed 
as a wide-scale deployment of healthcare facilities among 
patients, physicians, and other health-care workers to transport 
medical information accurately and securely anywhere, at 
anytime. It integrates unique capabilities of emerging wireless 
sensor network (WSN) technologies that can support a wide 
range of applications including telemedicine, patient 
monitoring, location-based medical services, emergency 
response, personalized monitoring, and incentive management 
[1]. But privacy and security requirements for these 
applications are very diverse as they are based on different 
usage scenarios ranging from pre-hospital, in-hospital, 
ambulatory, home monitoring, to database collection for 
long-term trend analysis [2]. Also the resource constriction 
and constant topology evolving characteristics of WSN further 
aggravate the security challenges. Hence, a properly designed 
end-to-end security architecture is the primary necessity for 
efficient utilization of WSN in U-Healthcare. 
   Ensuring complete and a good level of security for such 
types of networks however, is not a trivial task. As these types 
of networks use wireless communications, the threats and 
attacks against them are more diverse and often very large in 
scale. It is practically impossible to deal with all sorts of 
security threats with a single mechanism. Instead, a 
combination of different security schemes for a single network 
could be the solution [3]. 
   Considering the special features of wireless sensor networks, 
in this paper, we propose an efficient public key based security 
scheme for WSN. In our scheme, we use pseudoinverse matrix 
for the first part while the second part is a simple method for 
transferring decryption key to the receiver node. Our analysis 
and simulation results show that our scheme demonstrates a 
considerable gain in the level of security and is suitable 
enough to be employed with the current generation sensor 
nodes. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states 
the related works, Section 3 presents our proposal, Section 4 
states the performance analysis, and Section 5 concludes the 
paper with future research directions. 
 
2. Related Works 
 
So far a few security schemes have been proposed for 
healthcare sensor networks. CodeBlue [4] implements ECC on 
Mica2 mote using only integer arithmetic. CodeBlue 
comprises a suite of protocols for emergency response. 
WBAN (Wireless Body Area Network) infrastructure 
presented in [5] is to develop a wearable health status 
monitoring system.  
   In [6], [7], and [8], PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) based 
security solutions are proposed for healthcare. [6] emphasizes 
on multi-layered security infrastructure that copes with the 
strong user authentication procedures based on smart cards, 
digital certificates, and PKI systems. The system proposed in 
[7] comprises of six subsystems. In the proposed architecture, 
the authors used radio frequency (RFID) tag, wearable 
electrocardiogram (ECG) sensor, smart card, grid computing, 
PhysioNet, wired/wireless network, and public-key 
infrastructure technologies for Ubiquitous RFID Healthcare 
System for WSN. [8] proposes wireless PKI security scheme 
for 3G mobile communication. The scheme consists of a 
trusted server and a dual public key cryptosystem to provide 
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end-to-end security between mobile clients and the Healthcare 
Information System (HIS). 
   Typically the appropriateness of asymmetric systems for 
authenticity, integrity protection, and non-repudiation is 
widely accepted; alike for symmetric systems in data 
confidentiality. In this paper, we propose an asymmetric 
approach for confidentiality protection to demonstrate the 
merit of PKI and the setting for applying the scheme is a 
healthcare sensor network where security of medical data is 
one of the most important concerns. 
 
3. Our Security Scheme 
3.1   Network Model 
We consider a hierarchical model of the network where the 
primary components are; Patient (PT), Healthcare Service 
System (HSS), and Secure Base Station (SBS). HSS could be 
doctor, nurse or any other medical staffs. There are multiple 
SBSs installed in the network within the hospital compound. 
The SBSs could be replaced if necessary. They are connected 
with each other using wired or wireless technology and have 
unlimited energy sources. They can communicate among 
themselves if necessary. Any HSS or a PT is considered as a 
node in the model. The sensors which carry medical data are 
either wearable or attached with the HSSs or PTs. 
3.2   Pseudoinverse Matrix 
The pseudoinverse matrix or generalized inverse matrix [9] 
has a very nice property that could be used for cryptographic 
operations. It is well known that, a nonsingular matrix over 
any field has a unique inverse. For a general matrix of 
dimension nk × , there might exist more than one generalized 
inverse. This is denoted by, =),( nkM {A: A is a nk ×  
matrix}. Let, ),( nkMA∈ . If there exists a matrix 
),( knMB ∈  such that, AABA = and BBAB = , then each 
of A and B is called a generalized inverse matrix (or 
pseudoinverse matrix) of the other. In this paper, we use the 
notation gA  to denote the generalized inverse matrix or 
pseudoinverse matrix of A. We use pseudoinverse matrix for 
deriving the pairwise secret key between any HSS and SBS or 
between any PT and SBS. 
3.3   Bilateral Key Handshaking between SBS and PT (or 
HSS) 
Let a PT (or HSS) wants to join the network. For secure 
communications with SBS, it needs to derive a pairwise secret 
key with SBS(s). For this, following operations are performed: 
   1. The sensor ( is ) associated with PT (or HSS) randomly 
generates a matrix X  (dimension nm × ) and its 
psuedoinverse matrix gX . These matrices are kept secret in 
the node. 
   2. Then is calculates XX g and sends it to the nearest SBS. 
   3. In turn, SBS randomly generates another matrix Y with 
dimension kn× , and finds out its pseudoinverse matrix gY . 
These matrices are also kept secret in the SBS. 
   4. SBS calculates XYX g  and gg XYYX . Then it sends the 
resultant matrices to is . 
   5. Upon receiving the products of matrices from SBS, 
is calculates, ggg XYYXYYXX = and sends it back to SBS. 
   6. Now, both the node is  and the SBS can compute the 
common secret key. is gets it by calculating 
XYXYXX g =)(  and the SBS gets it by calculating 
XYYXYYg =)( . Both of these outcomes (XY) are the same 
matrix with dimension km × . Figure 1 shows the scheme and 
network structure. 
   The pairwise shared secret key (XY) with the SBS can also 
be stored in its memory before its deployment and can be used 
as the encryption key for the encryption-decryption phase. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Pairwise Secret Key Derivation 
3.4   Encryption and Decryption of Data for PT-to-HSS or 
HSS-to-PT Communications 
The main module in secure node-to-node communication is a 
central key generator (CKG) which is located at the SBS. The 
CKG helps any node in the network to decrypt the received 
encrypted messages from other nodes. If a node nA wants to 
send message securely to another node nB, it uses its pairwise 
key with the SBS for encrypting the message. Say for example, 
the encrypted message sent from nA to nB is )(MEXY . Here, M 
is the message sent from the sender to the receiver. XYE  
means that the message is encrypted with the key XY , which 
is actually the shared secret key between the SBS and the 
sender (either a PT or a HSS). Upon receiving the encrypted 
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message, nB places its own identity and the identity of the 
sender to the CKG. In turn, CKG generates a decryption key 
and transmits it to nB encrypting it with the secret shared key 
that it has with nB. As the CKG in the SBS has prior 
knowledge about the shared secret keys of both the nodes, it 
uses that knowledge to generate the decryption key. Now, nB 
first decrypts the encrypted message (the message sent from 
SBS) with its shared key with SBS, finds out the decryption 
key, and uses that key to decrypt the message sent from node 
nA. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Encryption and Decryption of Message by Two 
Communicating Nodes 
 
   Figure 2 shows the secure communication method between 
two nodes in the network. In the figure, XAYA is the shared 
secret key between nA and SBS, XBYB is the shared secret key 
between nB and the SBS, and Kd is the decryption key provided 
by the CKG to the receiving node. 
 
4. Performance Evaluation 
4.1   Initial Analysis 
In our scheme, any node is  sends the SBS an nn× matrix 
which is of 2n  bits. In turn, the SBS sends an kn× matrix 
and an nn× matrix. For this the total number of bits passed 
for the matrices is, )(2 knnnkn +=+ bits. Again, the node 
is  sends the SBS an nm×  bits. So, total number of bits for 
the matrices transmitted for deriving the shared key in the 
whole key handshaking process is, 
                           mnknnn +++ )(
2
 
                           )( mknnn +++=  
                           )2( mknn ++=  
   All the calculations here are linear and can be performed 
very easily. Moreover, our scheme is adequately secure as 
capturing the messages like XX g , XYX g ,  gg XYYX , and 
gXYY  could not be in any way helpful to construct the locally 
computed secret shared key XY . 
4.2   Simulation 
We have analyzed our PKC-based scheme in terms of energy 
cost, memory cost, security and scalability. In our simulation, 
we considered the specifications of Berkeley/Crossbow 
MICA2dot [10] motes. These motes are equipped with 8-bit 
ATmega128L microcontrollers with 4 MHz clock speed, 128 
KB program memory and Chipcon CC1000 low-power 
wireless transceiver with 433-916 MHz frequency band. The 
major power consumers in this mote are the processor and the 
wireless transceiver. During the transmission and reception 
operations, the microcontroller is turned on alongside the 
wireless transceiver. According to our calculations, the cost of 
transmission of one byte is 59.2 µJ while the reception 
operation takes about half of the transmission cost (28.6 µJ). 
The power to transmit 1 bit is equivalent to roughly 2090 clock 
cycles of execution of the microcontroller. In our case, we 
considered a packet size of 41 bytes (payload of 32 bytes, 
header 9 bytes). With an 8 byte preamble (source and 
destination address, packet length, packet ID, CRC and a 
control byte) for each packet we found that, to transmit one 
packet 49×  59.2 = 2.9008 mJ ≈ 2.9 mJ energy is required. 
Accordingly, the energy cost for receiving the same packet is 
49×  28.6 = 1.4014 mJ ≈ 1.4 mJ. Considering the same packet 
size for all the network operations, to set up a shared secret key 
with the base station each node needs (two transmissions and 
one reception) ((2×2.9) +1.4) = 7.2 mJ of energy. This cost is 
one time cost as once the shared secret key is derived, it could 
be used for the entire lifetime of the network unless the key is 
exposed or the node quits the network. 
   For node to node communication, the sender needs one 
transmission (2.9 mJ) and the receiver needs two receptions 
and one transmission (((2×1.4) +2.9) = 5.7 mJ). As a whole, 
the entire scheme could be well-afforded by the energy 
resources of the current generation sensor nodes.   
4.3   Comparison 
We compare our PKC-based scheme with C4W [11] and the 
one proposed in [12], which use simplified version of SSL 
handshake. Considering the energy consumption for 
communications, our scheme stays in the middle of other two 
schemes (shown in table 1).  
 
Table 1. Communication cost for our scheme and other PKC-based 
schemes 
 
Communication Cost PKC-based 
Schemes Sender (nA) Receiver (nB) 
C4W 6.3 mJ 4.8 mJ 
Our Scheme 10.1 mJ 5.7 mJ 
SSSL 19.4 mJ 19.6 mJ 
 
   For supporting our scheme, for sender node (nA), the 
numbers of transmissions and receptions are 3 and 1 
respectively which take ((3×2.9) +1.4) = 10.1 mJ) of energy 
in total. In case of receiver node (nB), it is 5.7 mJ for 1 
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transmission and 2 receptions. Figure 3 shows a comparative 
graph in terms of communication cost among these schemes. 
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Figure 3.  Communication cost for different PKC-based schemes 
 
   Though considering the communication cost, C4W exhibits 
better cost effectiveness than our scheme and SSSL, it requires 
pre-storing of all parameters before deployment. This in fact 
causes memory exploitation which is not present in our 
scheme. So, in terms of memory usage our PKC-based scheme 
is better and its communication cost is satisfactory. 
4.4   Further Comments  
In encryption decryption phase two messages are transmitted 
over public channel. When the receiver node needs the 
decryption key to decrypt a message from a particular sender 
node, it requests the SBS for the corresponding decryption key. 
In return, SBS encrypts the decryption key with the shared 
secret key of the receiver node. As the shared secret key is not 
known to any other node in the network, the decryption key for 
that particular sender-receiver pair could not be exposed. Now, 
the problem arises if the shared secret key of a node in the 
network is somehow compromised. In such a case, the base 
station revokes the shared key and the key handshaking 
process is re-initiated for that particular node. If such a 
compromise happens, even in that case, only one node is 
affected in the network while all other nodes could properly 
operate with confidential message transmission. 
   As any node can get a corresponding decryption key from 
the SBS (base station) for any sender node in the network, any 
pair of nodes in the network could communicate between 
themselves maintaining the high level of security. As 
mentioned earlier, for base station to node communications or 
node to base station communications, the shared secret key 
derived from the handshaking process is used which takes very 
little computation and message transmission. 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Works 
 
This paper proposes a security scheme for U-Healthcare 
Sensor Network (U-HSN) which uses the notion of public key 
cryptosystem. It should be mentioned that, our approach is 
well-scalable as any number of new sensors could be added to 
an existing wireless sensor network based on the requirements. 
Any newly added node could derive a shared secret key with 
the base station using the key handshaking process and then it 
could be used for node-to-node secure communications. In 
future, we would like to analyze our scheme in details 
considering different types of installation scenarios and 
security requirements of the application at hand. 
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